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Sitrep 26 April 1983

Yugoslavia

According to the US Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia's effort to draw a \$500 million credit from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) remains stymied by problems over negative pledge clauses. The BIS is requiring gold collateral for \$200 million of the credit, but before pledging gold the Yugoslavs must obtain waivers from creditors holding clauses entitling them to equal security. A Kuwaiti-owned bank in Bahrain, which holds the last outstanding clause, has not yet lifted this restriction even though Yugoslavia paid off overdue interest to the bank.

	Belgrade is very upset with the
apparent unwillingness of the Kuwa	aiti government to intervene in
lifting the gold clause and with b	(uwait's failure to provide
financial aid in concert with West	tern governments.
US Emba	assy that there are still

problems with French banks regarding the waiver of their negative The French had refused to waive clauses pledge clauses. contained in \$150 million worth of loans from 1981 until other Western banks agreed to exclude these loans from the commercial banks' refinancing package. In mid-April the French banks offered an unspecified "conditional" waiver which the BIS found unacceptable. Belgrade hopes to draw this week the \$300 million part of the BIS credit not backed by gold while pursuing official discussions with Kuwait and France on their negative pledge

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auses.		
	does not believe	
goslavia will	have to refinance its obligations in 1984. The	2
	based on the following considerations:	_
	tive refinancing program under discussion with	
	governments and banks provides for new money to	
	reserves and will ensure a rollover of short-term	
debt		2
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	a's current account deficit will decline in 1983	
Yugoslav	a s current account dericit will decrine in 1903	
-	balance in 1984. Economic recovery in the West	
and reach		
and reach	balance in 1984. Economic recovery in the West	
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and reach and Yugos while ear increase;	when growth in major Western markets will be	2
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	<u>:</u>	25 X 1
	lag in the first months of 1983. We estimate that	
	illion deficit	25 X 1
·	payments deficit for 1983 reached \$1 billion, even	
	nancing package now under discussion would be	
	build up the country's reserves. Moreover, poor	
·	int performance presumably would discourage banks	
	g any more credits than those in the refinancing	
	selgrade would then enter 1984 in the same	
•	that it faced at the beginning of 1983. The country	
•	ttle, if any, hard currency reserves, face its	
seasonal shor	tfall in foreign exchange earnings in the first half	
of the year,	and have to cover some \$2.5 billion in maturing	
medium and lo	ong-term credits during 1984.	25X1
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Romania	25X1
final agreement on the 1983	23/1
rescheduling of Romania's debt to banks was reached at the 13	
April meeting with Western bankers in Zurich. The accord calls	
for rescheduling 70 percent of principal payments due this	
year. The bankers deferred from July to August the first of four	
1983 payments on the remaining 30 percent of principal. Proposed	
interest rates of one and three-quarters percentage points over	
LIBOR with a one-percent front end fee mirror the 1982	
agreement.	25 X 1
Romania has only failed to meet	25 X ′
payments on government debts being contested in court and that	
payment will be made if the courts so order.	25X1
largely credit Romanian Minister of Finance	25X1
Petre Gigea for the improvement in relations with Romania this	
year. Gigea has established considerable creditor confidence,	
and the Romanians have been easier to deal with than last year.	
	25X1
The US Embassy in Paris reports that the Paris Club	
rescheduling meeting for Romania has been postponed at the	
request of a number of delegations who have short-term arrears or	
unsigned bilateral agreements with Romania. It was agreed that	
the chairman would send the Romanian finance minister a letter	
requesting confirmation by 6 May of settlement of all arrears to	
Paris Club creditors. Once creditor verification is received,	
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the Paris Club would notify Bucharest that it is prepar	red to
negotiate the 1983 rescheduling agreement on 16-17 May.	•
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Hungary	25>
the \$200 million	207
three-year loan syndicated for Hungary by Deutsche Bank was	
signed in Budapest on 18 April. Once the \$200 million	
subscription goal was reached in late March, Deutsche Bank	
offered the loan for additional syndication to 94 banks. Only	
three banks responded positively offering a total of \$7.5 million	
which will be used to reduce lead manager shares.	25)
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On 15 April, according to press reports, Western central	
banks granted Hungary a \$100 million short-term credit through	
the BIS. The loan was made despite assertions by central bankers	
that the \$500 million credit for Yugoslavia would be the last BIS	
bridging loan. The Hungarian credit represents a partial	
extension on the \$300 million BIS loan that came due in April.	
The IMF will repay the central banks in June out of the quarterly	
disbursement of its standby credit for Hungary. Earlier this	
year, the Hungarians broached the possibility of renewing the	
entire BIS loan to prevent depletion of their reserves. With	
completion of the Deutsche Bank loan, central bankers apparently	
concluded that Budapest could meet its BIS obligation out of	
commercial borrowings and IMF credits.	25
Although the Deutsche Bank syndication was a major	
achievement for Hungary, the need for a partial extension on the	
BIS loan indicates that the country's reserves remain dangerously	
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the Hungarians still fear a	
withdrawal of short-term credits that could exhaust their foreign	
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exchange assets. In our judgment, Hungary will be unable to	
raise enough commercial credits and to record a large enough	
payments surplus to rebuild its reserves by \$500 million in 1983	
as projected by the IMF.	25 X 1
US Embassy in Budapest that Hungary may well	25 X 1
request a second IMF standby credit later this year in order to	2514
strengthen its financial position.	25 X 1
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<u>Poland</u> .
Several meetings over the past month have produced little
progress in an accord on rescheduling Polish debt to commercial
banks.
National Coordinating Committees (NCCs) met at the end of
March to prepare a response to the Polish proposal of 21 March to
reschedule all principal and interest due between 1983 and 1990
for repayment during 1990 and 2002.
the consensus view of the
committees was that the terms were "obviously unreasonable" and
that the Poles were not prepared to negotiate seriously.
said that the committees agreed to seek terms similar to
the 1981 and 1982 agreements, which provided for rescheduling of
95 percent of principal and no rescheduling of interest.
Representatives of eight Western banks, using the guidance
from the NCC meetings, met with Polish officials in Zurich on 15
April.
the Poles repeated the
terms offered in March, which the bankers refused to consider a
formal proposal.
after the meeting the banks sent a
message to Warsaw asking "to begin serious discussions" that
would lead to "an agreement substantially similar to that of
1982." No further negotiations are scheduled;
the banks will take the initiative if by 7 May the Poles do not
propose a meeting.

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From Zurich, the Polish officials came to the United States
last week to visit banks in New York, Chicago, and California.
Bank Handlowy President Glazewski
appealed to the following terms to reschedule of 95 percent of
principal and more than 50 percent of interest payments due
bwetween 1983 and 1985. It is not clear whether these terms,
which are not far from what the banks have offered, represent a
revised proposal by the Poles. Glazewski's proposal was made to
one bank, and earlier in the week he
gave no indication of offering terms different from those
proposed previously. characterized the
Poles' visit to the banks as a head-on collision.
the delegation, after failing in attempts to obtain
agreement with the banks, will return to Warsaw and seek the
regime's approval to offer a more accommodating proposal.
The banks have presented a relatively united front to the
Poles so far, but
there are some differences among them. Although we know of no
bank that would accept the terms proposed by Warsaw, some West
German banksespecially Dresdner Bank, the leader of the bank
groupare most inclined to grant generous rescheduling terms.
Swiss banks as well as Lloyds Bank International of the United
Kingdom also take a relatively soft line. Most banks in the US
apparently favor an agreement at least as favorable to them as
last year, and one bank has argued for a higher interest spread
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on rescheduled amounts. Barclays and other British banks, French	
banks, and a few West German banks side with the US positon.	25X1 25X1

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Embassy Paris reports that the 11 April Paris Club meeting on Poland was a relatively low-key affair. Most countries—Canada and the Netherlands were the exceptions—indicated a desire to begin discussions with the Poles on rescheduling. The non-NATO countries were most insistent, but except for a veiled threat by Sweden, they did not push their previous threat to split from the Paris Club to reach a separate agreement from Warsaw. The creditors adopted a recommendation by the US representative to examine the issue in capitals at the political level and to reconvene the week of 13 May for further discussions. Several creditors—the neutrals, West Germany, Belgium, and Denmark—want the next meeting to decide to move forward with Polish debt to the Paris Club. (C Exdis)